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1. Introduction – international environmental law, reaching beyond the state 
The Stockholm United Nations (UN) Conference on the Human Environment in 
1972 brought an unprecedented degree of coherence to the consideration of 
environmental issues in the international arena.1 This event was prompted in 
large part by (mainly developed) states2 picking up on concern about 
environmental degradation that had originated in the scientific community3 and 
subsequently swiftly gained enormous grassroots support.4 Developing states, 
while also active in the Stockholm process, focussed more strongly on 
development issues as the source of environmental ills and as the driver for 
international action. The Stockholm Conference saw 113 state representatives5 
participate and interestingly, indicating that this area of international law in its 
modern incarnation was from its very genesis not to be solely the province of 
state-craft, ‘numerous’ (but significantly not enumerated) non-governmental 
                                            
1 There had been international law activity on a range of topics, beginning in the nineteenth 
century with bilateral fisheries treaties, followed by wider international agreements on migratory 
species conservation, see Phillipe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of international 
Environmental Law Cambridge (3rd edn.), Cambridge University Press, 2012 pp23-25, but 
activity was both comparatively limited and sporadic. 
2 See James Gustave Speth and Peter M Haas, Global Environmental Governance, 
Washington D.C.: Island Press, 2006 pp 56-57. 
3 Not least, Rachael Carson Silent Spring London: Reader’s Union, 1964. 
4 A number of high profile environmental non-governmental organisations were founded around 
this time, for example, Friends of the Earth in the United States in 1969 and Friends of the Earth 
International in 1971, see <http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/faqs/about_foe_founded.html> 
accessed 30 April 2014 and Greenpeace in Canada in 1971, see. 
<http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/about> accessed 30 April 2014. 
5 See UNEP ‘Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment’, para 13 at 
<http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=97> accessed 04 
February 2014. 
organization (NGO) representatives were also present.6 The Stockholm 
Conference was undoubtedly important in principle, as was the parties’ adoption 
of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment.7 This soft law document (taking a form that was, despite some 
commentator’s reservations as to its impact and efficacy, to become particularly 
significant in the complex and contested environmental sphere),8 while not 
legally binding on signatories, represented both a crucial institutional recognition 
of the escalating impact of human activity of the environment9 and a statement 
of intent to address it.10 The ambitious scope of action that would ultimately be 
required to effectively engage with the anthropogenic environmental impacts, 
extending well beyond the habitual realm of state activity, was specifically 
alluded to in the preamble to the Declaration: 
To achieve this environmental goal will demand the acceptance of 
responsibility by citizens and communities and by enterprises and 
institutions at every level, all sharing equitably in common efforts. 
Individuals in all walks of life as well as organizations in many fields, by 
their values and the sum of their actions, will shape the world 
environment of the future.11 
At the same time, this visionary conception of a future human/environment 
relationship extends not only beyond States but also an individualistic and state-
                                            
6 Ibid at para 17. 
7 At <http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503> 
accessed 30 April 2014. 
8 See, for example, Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment’ 
(1990-91) 12 Mich. J. Int’l L. 420. 
9 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, n 7, preamble, para 
1. 
10 Ibid, preamble, para 6. 
11 Ibid, preamble, para 7. 
centric conception of human rights as its sole focus; additionally it inculcates a 
pervasive, positive and expansive notion of human responsibility and agency 
that embraces not only individuals but also enfolds the human collectivities in 
various guises that generate environmental impacts at all levels. Nonetheless, 
despite this revolutionary rhetoric, the tenor of the Declaration as a whole, and 
the substantive principles that it embodied, were firmly focussed on the roles 
and responsibilities of States12  and international institutions.13 Principle 19 of 
the Declaration however, in recognising the importance of environmental 
education as: ‘…  essential in order to broaden the basis for an enlightened 
opinion and responsible conduct by individuals, enterprises and communities in 
protecting and improving the environment …’ did go some way to 
acknowledging the fact that addressing environmental degradation presented 
societal challenges that extended beyond states as entities. Implicit too in this 
statement supporting ‘responsible conduct’ is the conceptual root of wider public 
participation rights as one mechanism through which to employ of such 
‘enlightened opinion’ in the twin causes of environmental protection and 
improvement.     
In practical terms the founding of the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) in the wake of the Stockholm conference14 ensured that the 
environment had a discrete institutional presence within the UN (albeit a 
relatively weak one)15 and that environmental concerns remained on the 
                                            
12 For example, ibid, para 24. 
13 Ibid, para 25.  
14 UN General Assembly resolution 2997 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972. 
15 See, for example, Richard G Tarasofsky, ‘International Environmental 
Governance: Strengthening UNEP’ 2002 at <http://archive.unu.edu/inter-
linkages/docs/IEG/Tarasofsky.pdf> accessed 30 April 2014. UNEP’s role was eventually 
international community’s agenda. Nonetheless, while the Stockholm Summit 
undoubtedly set progress in international environmental law and policy in 
motion, its momentum was both slowed and truncated in relatively short order 
by the new complexity in global economic affairs precipitated by the oil crisis 
that began in 1973, which arguably pressed environmental concerns into the 
background. The new economic vulnerability16 experienced by developed states 
in this context ensured that progress was cautious, but, at the same time, it 
served to underline the emerging understanding of the prevalence and 
interconnectedness of global environmental issues and other aspects of state 
activity. While the 1970s in particular generated a great deal of legal activity at 
state and regional transnational levels, not least in the European Union (EU)17 
and under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD),18 the global international environmental scene was 
relatively quiet at this time, with a few notable exceptions, such as the adoption 
of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
                                                                                                                                
somewhat enhanced following the Rio+20 Conference in 2012, see the Outcome Document, 
‘The Future We Want’, para 88 at 
<http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/727The%20Future%20We%20Want%2019%20
June%201230pm.pdf> accessed 30 April 2014.These relatively marginal enhancements 
however fell well short of what had been sought by those concerned at UNEP’s lack of 
institutional muscle, see for example, Frank Biermann, ‘Reforming Global Environmental 
Governance: The Case for a United Nations Environment Organisation’ Stakeholder Forum, 
2011 at <http://www.stakeholderforum.org/fileadmin/files/WEO%20Biermann%20FINAL.pdf> 
accessed 28 April 2014. 
16 For a broader contextual consideration of the impact of the oil crisis on international 
environmental law, see Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Conserving the World’ Resources’ in James Crawford 
and Martti Koskenniemi (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to International Law, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, (2012) 398-420.  
17 See, for example, Ingmar von Homeyer, ‘The Evolution of EU Environmental Governance’ in 
Joanne Scott (ed.) Environmental Protection: European Law and Governance, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press (2009) pp1-26. 
18 See, for example, Iris Borowy, Defining Sustainable Development for Our Common Future: A 
History of the World Commission on Environment and Development Earthscan/Routledge, 
Abingdon, (2014), pp 28-30 and 39-40.  
and Flora19 (CITES) in 1973. It was however only in the run-up to and at the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio in 1992 
(considered below), that environmental matters regained a more dynamic 
species of global prominence akin to and even exceeding that which they had 
enjoyed in the Stockholm process. The UNCED saw 172 states participating, 
108 of these at head of state/government level and 2,400 NGOs with 17,000 
participants taking part in the parallel NGO forum. 20 
 
2. The WCED, participation and the emergence of sustainable development 
The central and highly ambitious, but also complex and contested, concept of 
sustainable development was researched, framed and taken forward to Rio 
through the work of the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(WCED), popularly known as the Brundtland Commission, and its resulting 
seminal report Our Common Future.21 At the conference itself the wealth of 
nuanced and conceptually rich material that had been produced on sustainable 
development by this process was, perhaps inevitably, reduced to the pervasive 
and still prevalent media-friendly sound-bite of the ‘Brundtland definition’: ‘… 
development that meets the needs of the present, without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs’.22 However, as Borowy 
points out in her recent comprehensive account of the work of the WCED, the 
                                            
19 At <http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.php> accessed 09 May 2014. 
20See UN Briefing Papers/The World Conferences: Developing Priorities for the 21st Century at 
<http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html> accessed 04 February 2014. 
21 World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford (1987) (the Brundtland Report). 
22 Ibid, Chapter 2 para 1. 
reductionist approach exhibited in the ‘Brundtland definition’, which has become 
the largely accepted orthodoxy:  
… trivializes both the work of the WCED and the challenges of 
sustainable development, which are at the bottom of the enormous 
discrepancy between widespread theoretical endorsement of the concept 
and the near absence of its implementation.23  
It is certainly the case that the flaws of the overly simplified conception of 
sustainable development as endorsed at Rio, not least in burying those integral 
yet politically unpalatable aspects of the WCED’s approach that focussed on 
what Jim MacNeill, its Secretary General, terms: ‘… the need to live within 
nature’s limits’,24 have been the subject of decades of wide-ranging critique and 
commentary.25 In any event, it can fairly be said that the emergence of the 
concept of sustainable development at Rio did at least serve to place the 
environment, which had again become a commonly neglected policy concern at 
the time, on to a notionally co-equal footing with dominant economic and social 
matters.   
 
In actuality and in the WCED’s conception, sustainable development with its 
necessarily expansive socio-political, economic and environmental grounding 
demands nothing less than the radical re-fashioning of the relationship between 
                                            
23 Borowy n 18 at p4. 
24 Ibid, Jim MacNeill, ‘Foreword’, at ix. 
25 See, for example, Neil K Dawe and Kenneth L Ryan ‘The Faulty Three-Legged-Stool Model 
of Sustainable Development’ Conservation Biology, 2002, 1458;  Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee 
‘Who Sustains Whose Development? Sustainable Development and the Reinvention of Nature’ 
Organization Studies 24(1) (2003) 143-180; Dire Tladi, Sustainable Development in 
International Law: An Analysis of Key Enviro-Economic Instruments, Pretoria University Law 
Press, Cape Town, 2007; Michael Redclift, Sustainable Development: Exploring the 
Contradictions Routledge/Taylor & Francis (electronic edition 2003); and Duncan French 
International Law and Policy of Sustainable Development, Manchester University Press 2005.   
humanity and the environment. This development had been prefigured, albeit in 
rudimentary form in the Stockholm Declaration, as discussed above and now, 
having come centre-stage comprises the central concern of this chapter. The 
paradigm shift necessary to re-work the human/nature relationship  inevitably 
entails engagement with societal complexity in its multifarious forms and this in 
turn necessitates re-envisioning the global polis and its governance. A core 
concern in this regard is the unprecedented, yet integrally inherent imperative in 
the concept of sustainable development, to draw in not only states but also 
communities and individuals in order to fundamentally refashion all facets of the 
human/nature relationship. This requires, amongst other things, supplementing 
the traditional ‘top-down’ governance model by harnessing bottom-
up/grassroots activity to established political processes.26 Thus, for all the many 
flaws in the concept of sustainable development as a whole,27 in real terms the 
greatest legacy wrought by the WCED and UNCED in the last two decades 
arguably lies in the fact that it necessitated initiating what is in principle (though 
admittedly as yet markedly less so in practice) a seismic shift in the nature of 
the global polis. This modernising development, representing the transference 
from government to governance, has its roots both in the inherent nature of the 
concept of sustainable development referred to above and in the methodology 
adopted by the WCED. The former intimated that, in principle, the adoption of 
public participation in the environmental sphere was a core element in 
sustainability praxis and the latter practically trialled a participatory approach. 
The WCED by dint of its own methodology – which saw the Commission travel 
                                            
26 Our Common Future, n 21. 
27 See, for example, Banerjee, n 25. 
the globe between 1983 and 1987 researching, developing and above all 
popularizing28 the concept of sustainable development - altered expectations 
about what can be achieved in terms of public engagement with international 
policy-making. Significantly, rolling out of a series of public hearings across the 
globe29 became an integral means of gathering the material necessary to inform 
the WCED’s deliberations. This hands-on collection of evidence from a vast 
range of what would now be termed stakeholders, thus played a part in shaping 
not only the WCED’s final report, but also in the evolution of participation in 
global sustainable development and  environmental governance. The hearings 
actively invoked a conception of sustainable development praxis embracing 
pluralism in harnessing not only the expertise of civil society but also of local 
governments, scientists and other experts, business and industry. MacNeill 
went so far as to identify these public hearings ‘… the key to our consensus…’, 
which in turn ‘was crucial to the success of our endeavours …’.30 The public 
meetings certainly served to galvanise the members of the WCED, generating a 
sense of urgency in their deliberations by dramatizing the real-world 
implications of what could otherwise have been reduced to abstract issues and 
by demonstrating how imperative it was that they should forge a workable 
consensus despite their widely differing personal perspectives.31 It could also be 
argued that the hearings gave the WCED a much higher public profile than had 
been the norm for previous UN Commissions, simultaneously generating of 
                                            
28 The WCED did not ‘invent’ sustainable development as a concept, though it did further 
develop it and bring it into the mainstream. See Borowy n 18 p3. 
29 These were achieved despite the fact that in some parts of the world the concept of public 
involvement was politically contentious or even a completely unknown quantity. Ibid,  p69.  
30 Ibid , viii. 
31 Ibid,  Chapters 3-9. 
both wider support for its activities and creating a climate of expectation as to its 
results. In concrete terms this would seem to be borne out in many ways and 
not least by the fact that Our Common Future became the most widely read UN 
report that had ever been produced.32   
 
The WCED process and methodological approach not only set the scene for the 
UNCED, it also played a part grounding in the subsequent development of a 
broader international incarnation of emerging environmental citizenship,33 
identified by Bell as one of the forms of ‘multiple, adjectival citizenship’ that was 
to rise again to prominence in the late twentieth century.34 This was evident in 
the WCED’s incorporation into its core activities and resulting outputs of the 
idea that, while state-craft remains central to addressing our interlocking global 
environmental crises at a macro level, to do so effectively also requires 
engagement at the grass-roots/micro level. Drawing on its own methodology 
and resulting incarnation of the concept of sustainable development, the 
WCED’s ultimate report therefore pointed comprehensively for the first time to 
the necessity of complementing the traditional, statist, ‘top-down’ model of 
international law with a new harnessing of ‘bottom-up’ civil society activity and 
uniting these in a common cause.35  
 
3. Civil Society and the UNCED 
                                            
32 Ibid, viii. 
33 See, for example, Andrew Dobson (ed.), Environmental Citizenship, (2006) MIT Press, 
Cambridge MA 
34 Derek R Bell ‘Liberal Environmental Citizenship’ Environmental Politics Vol. 14 Mo. 2 179-194 
(2005) at 180. 
35 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future 
(1987) at <http://conspect.nl/pdf/Our_Common_Future-Brundtland_Report_1987.pdf.> 
(accessed 04 December 2013), in particular Chapter 12. 
The perception of the need for bottom-up engagement with sustainable 
development was not limited to the role and activities of the WCED; in parallel 
to this process, civil society had been active in garnering a role for itself in the 
wider sustainability debate. While some contemporaneous commentators 
reported the role of civil society at the Rio Summit in frankly contemptuous 
terms,36 the reality was that, behind the scenes of the colourful parallel NGO 
side event, and long before it in the run-up to the UNCED, serious work had 
been done, influence generated and results reaped. We can see a concrete 
example of this in the activities of women’s groups in  in contributing to shaping 
Agenda 21.   
 
The prominent role forged for and by women in Agenda 21 did not come out of 
the ether and in two important respects it can be argued that in this context the 
door was already open to their participation. Firstly, the UN had an established 
history of quite extensive engagement with the complex cross-cutting issues 
raised by gender.37 Concomitantly the women’s movement had a working 
knowledge of the mechanics of participating in international law and policy 
making processes. This history of interaction had created shared pools of 
institutional and civil society experience, knowledge, networks and contacts that 
could potentially be exploited in other contexts. Broadly speaking though, the 
UN’s approach to gender prior to 1992 had been a top-down process (albeit 
                                            
36 The Economist’s Special Correspondent in Rio: ‘The Green Legacy’ 13 June 1992 
<http://www.economist.com/node/15058218> accessed 04 February 2014. 
37 For a very brief graphic overview see UN Women: ‘A History of Gender Balance in the United 
Nations’ 
<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/uncoordination/documents/overview/unsystem/unsystemtimeli
ne-infographic.pdf> accessed 28 July 2014. 
arguably an innovative one that was at times highly responsive to grassroots 
input), with intergovernmental organisations and states taking the lead in 
fostering first the inclusion, then the prioritisation and ultimately the 
mainstreaming agenda in the search for more effective policies and 
programmes.38 Secondly, sustainable development, while also promoted and 
facilitated by intergovernmental organisations and states, is as alluded to 
above, also necessarily predicated on grass-roots involvement, thus driving the 
need for engagement with stakeholder groups. Key mechanisms in facilitating 
the radical degree of grass-roots engagement that sustainable development 
requires include nurturing and developing the role of civil society, which was a 
feature of the WCED’s working practices and was to become a central element 
of Agenda 21 (of which more below).39 The latter would actively cultivate the 
involvement of nine ‘major groups’ as instrumental in forging and taking forward 
developing the sustainability agenda. Women would be numbered among 
them,40 undoubtedly a significant development in principle, but not a surprise, 
as the women’s issues were  already a well-established area within the UN 
system.41  Furthermore, and this was to prove particularly valuable in the 
sustainability context, in general terms the women’s movement drew support 
                                            
38 Karen Morrow ‘Not so much a meeting of minds as a coincidence of means: Ecofeminism, 
gender mainstreaming and the United Nations’ Thomas Jefferson Law Review, Vol. 28 No.2, 
(2005) pp185-204.  
39 Jacklyn Cock ‘The World Women’s Congress for a Healthy Planet’ Agenda No. 12 Rural 
Politics (1992) pp 63-66.  
40 The others being: children and youth; indigenous peoples; NGOS; Local Authorities; workers 
and trade unions; business and industry; the scientific and technological community and 
farmers – see UN Agenda 21 at 
<https://docs.google.com/gview?url=http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/A
genda21.pdf&embedded=true> accessed 20 May 2014.   
41 See Hilkka Pietila: ‘The Unfinished Story of Women and the United Nations’ Development 
Dossier, United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service, New York and Geneva (2007) 
online at http://www.un-ngls.org/orf/pdf/UnfinishedStory.pdf accessed 28 July 2014, in particular 
chapters 2 and 4. 
and influence from established global grassroots networks and women also 
played an established role in the rank and file of grassroots environmental 
organisations and (to some degree) their leadership.42 These factors combined 
to see the women’s movement excellently positioned to push its priorities to the 
fore in the sustainability context more generally and in Agenda 21 in particular. 
The most high profile initiative in this regard in the run up to the UNCED was 
instituted by the Women’s Environment and Development Organisation 
(WEDO),43 a leading women’s environmental NGO. It instituted the World 
Women’s Congress for a Healthy Planet in Miami in 1991, which built on and 
developed existing women’s networks to ensure that the broad spectrum of 
women’s opinion from the developed and the developing world was represented 
in an open and inclusive participatory process. The Congress proved a 
significant platform for women’s engagement with the new sustainability 
oriented strand of international environmental law and policy. In concrete terms 
the Congress produced its own outcome document, ‘Women’s Action Agenda 
21’,44 which in turn influenced redrafting of the original supposedly ‘gender 
neutral’ draft text of Agenda 21, integrating gender issues throughout, which 
remain in the document as finally agreed at the UNCED itself.45  
 
4. The UNCED, participation and sustainable development 
                                            
42 Robert R M Verchick ‘In a Greener Voice: Feminist Theory and Environmental Justice’ 1996 
Harvard Women’s Law Journal Vol. 19, 23. 
43 See <http://www.wedo.org/about> accessed 04 May 2014. 
44 At <http://www.iisd.org/women/action21.htm> accessed 31 July 2014.. 
45 Karen Morrow: ‘Gender, International Law and the Emergence of Environmental Citizenship’ 
pp 33-61 in Susan Buckingham-Hatfield et al.: In the Hands of Women - Women, Human Rights 
and the Environment, Manchester University Press, 2006. 
The most prominent achievements of the UNCED, as viewed at the time and 
probably until their momentum faltered and they were seen as unable to keep 
pace with accelerating environmental degradation in the respective areas, were 
the adoption of a number of the high profile hard law multi-level environmental 
agreements (MEAs) conventions: the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change46 and the Convention on Biodiversity.47 However, despite these 
relatively promising beginnings, on-going progress in all of these areas is at 
best slow and by all measures woefully inadequate as climate change48 and 
biodiversity depletion49 on the whole remain seemingly intractably problematic.  
 
In real terms  it is the Rio Summit’s initially relatively unheralded and 
contemporaneously underrated soft law outcomes, notably the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development50 and its accompanying ‘blueprint for 
sustainability’ - Agenda 21,51 that have arguably proved to have more significant 
impacts in altering our engagement with anthropogenic environmental impacts 
in the longer term.52 If, as suggested above, in considering the input of women’s 
                                            
46 At 
<http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/c
onveng.pdf> accessed 04 February 2014. 
47 At <http://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf> accessed 04 February 2014. 
48 See for example, IPCC 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (2014) at 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/> accessed 28 July 2014. 
49 See, for example, Stuart M. Butchart et al.: ‘Global Biodiversity: Indicators of Recent Declines’ 
28 May 2010 Vol. 328 Science pp 1164-1168 at 
http://sci.odu.edu/biology/directory/Butchart%20et%20al%20Global%20biodiversity%20declines
%20Science.pdf accessed 28 July 2014. 
50 At 
<http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163> 
accessed 04 February 2014.  
51 At <http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf> accessed 04 
February 2014. 
52 See, for example, Karin Bäckstrand, Karin (2006) ‘Democratising Global Environmental 
Governance. Stakeholder Democracy after the World Summit on Sustainable Development’, 
European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 467-498. 
groups into Agenda 21,53 stakeholder participation had already proved 
significant in the run-up to the UNCED, its continuing significance was secured 
by the status accorded to it in these summit outcomes. This line of developing 
the prioritisation of participation in international environmental governance was 
of course also in harmony with other more general expressions of the UN’s 
ethos in this regard in relation to state systems in human rights instruments.54 
The Rio Declaration however instituted a significant step by placing participation 
and, by necessary implication, procedural matters firmly on the international 
agenda, stating in Principle 10 that: 
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all 
concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each 
individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the 
environment that is held by public authorities, including information on 
hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the 
opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall 
facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making 
information widely available. Effective access to judicial and 
administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be 
provided.55  
                                            
53 Some of the other major groups were also similarly well-positioned in this context and at this 
time, for example workers and trades unions, others faced greater challenges in exerting 
influence in the international stage but were rapidly gaining momentum.    
54 Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, affirms the right of 
everyone to take part (directly or indirectly) in the government of his or her country at 
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/> accessed 29 May 2014. 
55 Principle 10, 1992 UN Declaration on Environment and Development at 
<http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163> 
accessed 14 October 2013. 
In addition to recognising the importance of participation in principle and 
highlighting the need for it in the formerly neglected environmental sphere, the 
Rio Declaration also identified the three core human rights-based elements that 
are essential to its realisation: access to information; participation in decision-
making processes and access to justice. This triad of procedural participation 
rights was not new and has its antecedents in one form or another in most 
domestic legal systems – what was novel was the transplantation of long-
established human rights into a new area and ultimately extending their reach in 
some respects onto the international arena. In light of this it is no surprise that 
aspects of rights–based participation had emerged in international policy 
documents on sustainable development 56 that effectively acted as precursors 
to the Rio process and outcomes; for example in the oft-cited Ministerial 
Declaration on Environmentally Sound and Sustainable Development in Asia 
and the Pacific,57 para. 27 of which affirmed:  
…the right of individuals and non-governmental organizations to be 
informed of environmental problems relevant to them, to have the 
necessary access to information, and to participate in the formulation and 
implementation of decisions likely to affect their environment. 
The trinity of participation rights invoked in the Rio Declaration however took 
participation to its logical conclusion – access to information and participation 
are not fully meaningful unless accompanied and supported by a right of legal 
challenge to the decisions arrived at through their use. Rio also provided a high-
                                            
56 For a comprehensive account of developments in this area see Donald K Anton and Dinah L 
Shelton: Environmental Protection and Human Rights Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
2011.  
57Bangkok, 16 October 1990, A/CONF.151/PC/38. 
profile focal point that served to popularize the notion of participation in the 
sphere of sustainability. The participation rights invoked at Rio have 
subsequently been described by UNEP as ‘citizen’s environmental rights’58 and 
their most famous and legally significant regional manifestation to date has 
been as the central planks the Aarhus Convention,59 which Kofi Annan has 
described as ‘… the most ambitious venture in environmental democracy 
undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations’.60 This contextualisation 
of the aforementioned trinity of rights chimes with the fact that they may be 
regarded as central to a liberal conception of environmental citizenship, such as 
that posited by Bell61 who founds his view of what he prefers to term ‘citizens of 
an environment’ on a dual conception of a human right to ‘have our basic needs 
met’ and the [Rawlsian] ‘fact of reasonable pluralism.’ 62 The former accounts 
for substantive entitlement, the latter he argues suggests: 
…one conception that all reasonable citizens should accept for the 
purposes of a theory of political justice, namely, the nature and value of 
the environment is ‘a subject about which there is reasonable 
disagreement’.63 
This element of citizenship therefore accounts for the need for procedural rights, 
which, in addition to enjoying value in their own right, are required to support the 
(inevitable) contestation of substantive rights claims in practice. Drawing on this 
                                            
58 ‘UNEP Welcomes Entry into Force of the Aarhus Convention’ at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=224&ArticleID=2950&l=e
n accessed 29 May 2014. 
59 UNECE Convention on Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters at 
<http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf> accessed 29 May 2014. 
60 Quoted in UNEP n 53. 
61 Bell, n 34. 
62 Ibid 183.  
63 Ibid 185. 
in the legal sphere (and disregarding the other social and political ways in which 
these may be made manifest), exercising environmental citizenship rights 
requires as a minimum the institution of a number of specific procedural rights. 
Building on Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration and its elaboration in the Aarhus 
Convention,  chief amongst these are: access to information (which must be in 
such a form as to enlighten and empower rather than confuse and obfuscate); 
the opportunity to attempt to influence decision-making processes (requiring 
involvement at an early stage, while options are still open); and the capacity and 
ability to contest legally problematic outcomes.  
 
Consideration of public participation in environmental law tends all too often to 
assume its beneficial qualities as a given64 and indeed they are difficult to 
gainsay, (other than on grounds of added expense and delay)65; it is much rarer 
to find discussion that points to its concrete contribution to decision-making. 
One notable exception is the work of the United Kingdom’s Department of 
Environment, Transport and the Regions66 which promotes participation as 
having practical benefits in terms of the quality of the individual decision arrived 
at (ensuring that it is more fully informed, benefitting from public ‘skills and 
enthusiasm’ and first-hand knowledge)67 and for the health of democracy more 
generally. Rather less predictably for a document emerging from a government 
department sponsored workshop, public participation is also characterised as a 
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moral duty that is incumbent on public authorities (as they work for the public 
and need to be informed about their wishes) but which also applies to 
individuals as: ‘[e]ach person has a stake in protecting and enhancing the 
environment ….’.68 This attempt to combine state-based/top-down activity with 
public participation/bottom up approaches presents a concretisation of a core 
element of the theory of sustainable development and provides an example of 
attempting to re-fashion the decision-making paradigm. Its rationale lies in the 
novelty and complexity of what is at stake: ‘[S]olutions to achieve economic, 
social and environmental improvements at the same time will only be found if 
everyone is involved and if the discussion is open so that new ideas and 
approaches can be considered.’69  
 
5. Environmental (participation and substantive) rights 
In many ways the rise of procedural participation rights at Rio made perfect 
sense in practical terms as they were integral to sustainable development and a 
product of the WCED and UNCED procedures (see above) – but more than 
this, they fell fully formed into a convenient yet nonetheless erroneous tendency 
(that had begun to emerge in the 1980s) to conflate environmentalism and 
human rights activism.70 While there are undoubted synergies between the two 
areas, and where these occur they lend themselves very well to the pursuit of 
activism and legal claims through established human rights based approaches, 
the coincidence of human rights and environmental priorities is by no means a 
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given and the relationship between the two is often fraught and always complex. 
Nonetheless, in light of continued environmental degradation and an oft 
associated flagrant disregard for the human rights (of minorities and indigenous 
peoples in particular) and in the absence of productive international law 
engagement with many environmental problems that has been manifest as the 
momentum generated by the UNCED flagged, Conca suggests the rise of 
environmental human rights activism has filled the resulting lacuna. He argues 
that it suggests the possibility that: ‘these contentious political episodes may be 
supplanting interstate bargaining as the primary motive force behind the further 
institutionalization of some form of global environmental governance.’71 This 
probably overstates the case, given the difficulties in litigating environmental 
human rights claims (not least in respect of standing, causation and in many 
cases even justiciability) and the fact that it represents but one strand  - albeit a 
high profile and innovative one - in a complex web of global/local and 
legal/political engagement with environmental issues. In any event, it seems 
likely that procedural human rights based environmental litigation will remain 
significant both in its own right and in the continued absence of an agreed, 
overarching, specific, substantive hard law72 environmental human right in 
international law in either human rights or environmental regimes. This is not to 
say that such a development is not potentially viable, but it would involve 
considerable practical and conceptual challenges.73 Thus, despite concentrated 
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efforts by international institutions to push the substantive environmental right 
agenda forward, such as the UN Human Rights Council’s lengthy involvement 
in this area,74 the concept has not yet gained substantial traction amongst 
states. In the absence of progress, vociferous NGO activism has emerged in 
this area, culminating in attempts under the auspices of the ‘Stand Up For Your 
Rights’75 initiative, to codify an environmental human right. Nonetheless there 
seems to be little or no realistic prospect of an overarching global substantive 
international environmental right emerging in the short to medium term.76 
Indeed even the development of narrower substantive environmental rights 
such as the right to water, appear to be intractably mired in an international 
system that seems incapable of reaching agreement on them.77   Nonetheless, 
many and various environmental rights are now contained in regional 
international law instruments78 and increasingly in many state constitutions,79 
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and though these vary considerably in both their formulation and justiciability, 
they continue to fuel debate on further developing international environmental 
rights in like fashion.  
While substantive international environmental rights remain problematic, the 
same is not true for procedural environmental rights of the type invoked under 
the Principle 10 triad. 80 These tend to be less contentious, not least because 
(as noted above) it is possible to regard them less as a novel category of 
environmental rights, than as an application of well-established human rights in 
an environmental context. Procedural rights also appeal to states more than 
substantive rights as they tend, in guaranteeing process rather than outcome, to 
allow maximum room to manoeuvre. In any event, they play an important role in 
environmental issues at all levels. Hayward goes so far as to argue that 
procedural rights are ‘superior’ to substantive rights in the environmental 
sphere.81   
While procedural rights are not exclusively applicable in environmental cases, 
nonetheless, they are arguably developing new, interesting and potential far-
reaching dimensions when employed in these contexts that can serve to 
augment the importance of the environment in decision-making processes that 
does have value in its own right.  
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As a matter of principle, despite the very real difficulties that it presents, the 
search for a meaningful manifestation of a global over-arching substantive 
environmental right arguably remains a matter of the utmost and most profound 
necessity in the existentially crucial task of re-casting the Earth/human 
paradigm in a more sustainable guise. Nonetheless, procedural rights are of 
considerable utility in this regard, not least in light of present problems evident 
in domestic law in ascribing concrete content to a substantive environmental 
right that can render such claims difficult to litigate. However, it must be kept in 
mind that, while procedural rights-based claims may secure environmental 
issues their day in court, given their  intrinsic focus on due process they do not 
necessarily secure environmentally desirable outcomes – they merely ensure 
that decisions arrived at are duly made. 
 
6. Civil Society Participation in Sustainable Development between the UNCED 
and the UNCSD 
The ongoing and thoroughgoing level of civil society engagement and 
participation in environmental law and policy processes initially mandated by 
Agenda 21 and fostered thereafter under the auspices of the UN Commission 
on Sustainable Development82 (CSD, a functional commission of the UN 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) inaugurated after Rio) underlined the 
mainstreaming intent of the UNCED developments and generated considerable 
expectation. While far from perfect,83 as is to be expected in developing a new 
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modality, the CSD did solid work as a ‘pathfinder’84 in participatory sustainable 
development praxis, albeit not without some prompting from the UN General 
Assembly,85 in particular in sharing best practice and building stakeholder 
capacity. Its institutional profile was however comparatively low even within the 
UN and its work did not ultimately generate a great deal momentum in the 
sustainable development policy agenda.86 
Nonetheless,  operationalising the concept of sustainable development had 
created a practical need to and laid a conceptual foundation for expanding and 
refining participation in its areas of concern, and the CSD propagated a great 
deal of good practice  in this regard in particular in the challenging area of 
forging links  between hithertofore discrete bottom-up and top-down systems. 
Its work in this area, organising regular themed meetings and disseminating 
good practice, has arguably had important implications, commencing a slow87 
but also profound re-shaping of this branch of the international polis and its 
culture. In a direct manifestation of this, UNEP also embraced the newly-
prioritised participation culture fostered by the UNCED outcomes, stepping up 
its existing efforts in this regard and working with Agenda 21 major groups and 
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other stakeholders.88 UNEP’s experience in this regard has enabled it to identify 
a number of practical benefits arising from the participatory approach in the 
sustainable development arena at an international level. These include allowing 
access to the various abilities of civil society groups to provide services; 
representation; advocacy and policy input; capacity building; and to carry out 
social functions.89 Furthermore, civil society participation is increasingly 
identified as a key element in fashioning ‘sound environmental governance’ 
through not only garnering wider support for decisions but also by opening up 
access to decision-making processes to improve transparency and foster 
accountability.90 Above all, in the sustainability context, UNEP views civil society 
participation as providing a specifically ‘environmental’ counterweight to the 
social and economic elements of the sustainability triad.91  
 
7. The UNCSD, participation and sustainable development 
Despite the promising start provided by the WCED and the UNCED, and 
incremental developments in the interim, by the advent of the United Nations 
Conference on Sustainable Development (the UNCSD), popularly known as 
‘Rio+20’, it was universally acknowledged that progress on sustainable 
development had stalled.92 The conference outcome document, ‘The Future We 
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92 A/RES/6/288 ‘The Future We Want’ at 
<http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/727The%20Future%20We%20Want%2019%20
June%201230pm.pdf> accessed 30 April 2014 for example pointed to the need for 
Want’,  was at great pains to underline the collective nature of the endeavour to 
breathe new life into sustainability. Thus it took pains to underline its 
participatory credentials, even beginning its preamble by referring to not only 
the role of states and governments but also specifically to the ‘… full 
participation of civil society…’93 in the process. The document also stated, 
underlining the great breadth of participation that this entails, that: ‘… 
sustainable development must be inclusive and people-centred, benefiting and 
involving all people…’94  ‘The Future We Want’ of course also pointed to its 
sustainability heritage, reaffirming past outcomes and agreements, including the 
Stockholm and Rio Declarations and Agenda 21.95 Crucially for current 
purposes the document also explicitly (re)embraced the participation agenda, 
devoting considerable discrete coverage to the issues that this raised.96 
Significantly the document not only reiterated the existing approach, it also 
augmented it by adopting an expansive approach towards its future 
development stating that:   
We underscore that broad public participation and access to information 
and judicial and administrative proceedings are essential to the 
promotion of sustainable development. Sustainable development 
requires the meaningful involvement and active participation of regional, 
national and subnational legislatures and judiciaries, and all major 
groups … as well as other stakeholders … .In this regard, we agree to 
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work more closely with the major groups and other stakeholders, and 
encourage their active participation, as appropriate, in processes that 
contribute to decision-making, planning and implementation of policies 
and programmes for sustainable development at all levels.97  
 
‘The Future We Want’ acknowledged the key role played and to be played by 
civil society in facilitating public participation in sustainable development, noting  
its ability to contribute ‘… diverse experience, expertise and capacity, especially 
in the area of analysis, the sharing of information and knowledge, promotion of 
dialogue and support of implementation of sustainable development’.98 The 
document also underlined the conditions required to promote this wide-ranging 
civil society engagement including: improved access to information; effective 
capacity building; and viable and accessible information technology in enabling 
this.99  
In a like vein, in terms of future institutional provision for sustainable 
development, where reform was very much the order of the day, ‘The Future 
We Want’ promised to: 
Enhance the participation and effective engagement of civil society and  
other relevant stakeholders in the relevant international forums and, in 
this regard, promote transparency and broad public participation and 
partnerships to implement sustainable development.100 
Following the UNCSD and building on the ongoing commitment to 
mainstreaming sustainable development expressed by the international 
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community and the adoption of a newly enhanced profile for it, a substantive 
reform process has begun. This is chiefly reflected in the replacement of the 
CSD with the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development 
(HLPF)101 in 2013. On the one hand the HPLF sets out its stall as an 
intergovernmental forum much more clearly than was the case for the CSD 
which many in itself prove cause for concern, on the face of it running counter to 
the more catholic approach that it replaces. The HPLF promises to offer a 
much-needed more holistic and systemic consideration of sustainable 
development issues that has previously been the case.102 On the other hand the 
HLPF claims to build closely on what has gone before103 and aspires to 
continue the CSD’s active engagement with major groups and (even more 
expansively given the perceived limitations of the major groups approach)104 
other stakeholders. At the first meeting of the HLPF in 2013, coverage of the 
sustainable development agenda105 to a degree echoed that at the UNCSD 
itself, with economic and to a lesser extent social priorities placed strongly to 
the fore.106 Distinctively though  on this occasion environmental concerns 
formed a prominent refrain and participants called for the HLPF to develop ‘…a 
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coherent approach that integrates in a balanced manner the three dimensions 
of sustainable development.’107 Coverage of the participation agenda too gave 
some grounds for optimism, with major groups and other stakeholders among 
the active participants at the event108 and the encouraging and expansive 
statement that: 
… enhanced and coordinated participation of major groups and other 
relevant stakeholders such as private philanthropic organizations, 
educational and academic entities, persons with disabilities, volunteer 
groups and other stakeholders is essential to the success of the high-
level political forum and of the post-2015 development agenda.109  
   
8. The UNCED/UNCSD’s participation legacy? 
The UNCED and UNCSD processes and outcomes relating to broadening 
participation in sustainable development and by dint of this environmental 
governance can be viewed as setting positive precedents for invoking change 
but they do not by any means provide a template for substantive progress. 
While their combined effect has the potential to actualise a fundamental 
alteration in the way in which the business of international environmental law 
and policy is done, doubtless of enormous significance in principle, to date 
progress  in practice has been at best limited. Together, if fully pursued, they 
could mainstream the nascent re-fashioning of the very nature of the 
international polis, augmenting the extension of its reach as demonstrated 
across the range of the WCED and UNCED preparatory processes discussed 
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above. The UNCED and UNCSD outcome documents endorse a conception of 
an active international community that extends well beyond traditional state and 
intergovernmental actors; giving non-state actors (initially  in the guise of the 
nine Agenda 21 major groups referred to above and latterly reaching more 
widely still) a more marked, extensive and above all constant role110 than had 
previously been the case in international environmental law. The motivation for 
this shift first in attitude and in the longer term behaviour towards non-state 
actors lies not in states embracing a new pluralism in international 
environmental affairs; rather it was necessitated by one of the core 
characteristics of the concept of sustainable development which, as 
acknowledged in the WCED process, discussed above, is as dependant on 
grassroots buy-in and bottom-up action as it is on statecraft. Thus, from the 
outset, advancing sustainability has been understood as requiring not only the 
engagement of states that is the traditional province of international law, but 
also the active involvement of civil society, secured in large part by expanding 
rights-based participation into a new realm. By signing up to the Rio Declaration 
and Agenda 21, states were effectively ‘buying in’ to this approach, though 
perhaps not fully taking on board its implications at the time. This would seem to 
be borne out by the effective relegation of much civil society involvement in the 
sustainable development agenda into the sphere of the CSD in the two decades 
after the UNCED which effectively enabled the UN to ‘tick the participation box’ 
while confining  participation to an institutional by-water.  Belatedly, the post 
UNCSD process suggests that the fuller implications of a viable sustainability 
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agenda and in particular in the conception and operationalization of sustainable 
development goals that are likely to be the province of the HLPF are beginning 
to be more fully appreciated – though it is too soon to tell if this will in fact lead 
to substantive further development of the participation agenda or mere lip-
service towards it and a retrograde return to a state-centrism that is bound to 
fail to deliver on sustainability. 
Conclusion 
It can be argued that, for all of its limitations, the expansive participatory 
approach to sustainability pioneered by the WCED and endorsed at the 
UNCED, did indeed sow what may well prove to be, in the words of the poet 
Simon Armitage: ‘The seeds of the world for the world after this’,111 by laying a 
foundation for innovative modes of expanded societal engagement in 
international environmental law and policy. However, it remains to be seen 
whether these seeds will be better nurtured in the wake of the UNCSD than has 
been the case hithertofore. That they should be is imperative as a response to 
the ‘new world’ that we now seem set on an inexorable course toward; one in 
which we are exceeding/approaching crucial planetary boundaries that make it 
incumbent on humanity to make sustainable development a way of life rather 
than a mere catchphrase.112 Whether this will actually be achieved remains to 
be seen. 
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